Accepted Paper at ARES 2026

18. August 2026

Abstract: Towards Zero Trust Attestation for Confidential VMs in Public Clouds

Confidential Computing promises to remove the hypervisor from the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), enabling data processing protected from Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). This requires verifying the integrity of the entire software stack running in Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs), i.e., remote attestation. While an established concept, its potential often remains untapped. One of the main obstacles to practical deployment is that the verifier requires a list of reference hashes for all software running on the proving platform. Given the complexity and frequent updates of software, collecting such a list is a tedious task. In this paper, we analyze the contents of measurement registers in CVMs and demonstrate how to deterministically precompute their values from reproducible software builds, extending supply chain security to the runtime phase. We further evaluate the feasibility by examining the reproducibility of different CVM images, and show that, while precomputation is possible, it remains a tedious process with several practical gaps that need to be addressed. We present a comprehensive evaluation of CVM solutions across major hyperscalers and assess the feasibility of attesting CVMs without implicitly relying on CSP trust, enabling Zero Trust architectures. Based on our findings, we provide recommendations for streamlining measurement register computation.